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RADIO Propaganda Report

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PEKING PROPAGANDA ON THE CUBAN CRISIS THROUGH 1 NOVEMBER,
WITH A REVIEW OF SATELLITE COMMENT

An edited compendium of propaganda reactions based on daily FBIS reviews of broadcast materials, prepared as the crisis was developing

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PROPAGANDA REPORT 2 NOVEMBER 1962

The principal section of this report, pages 1-12, amalgamates and expands daily FBIS reviews of Peking propaganda behavior during the Cuban crisis, tracing Communist China's progressively more open censure of the Soviet Union's actions. European and Asian satellite reactions are recorded in a supplementary section, pages 13-24.

This compendium does not represent an exhaustive review of the propaganda. Its primary purpose is to provide a preliminary reference aid for future research.

Soviet propaganda on the crisis from 23 through 30 October is reviewed in Radio Propaganda Report CD.214 of 30 October 1962.

PEKING PROPAGANDA ON THE CUBAN CRISIS THROUGH 1 NOVEMBER,

WITH A REVIEW OF SATELLITE COMMENT

PEKING MEDIA

Peking's reaction evolved from initial reportage stressing CPR worldwide (but not Soviet) support for Cuba, to comment conveying disapprobation of the USSR's behavior (victory is determined by "the masses," not by "the much vaunted weapons of imperialists and reactionaries," and the Chinese are "the most faithful and reliable" friends of the Cubans), to a transparent indictment of the Soviet Union for willingness to sacrifice Cuban interests. Peking's rebuffs to the Soviet Union become more pointed on 31 October and blatant on 1 November, when the U.N. role was openly denounced. The pattern at this writing indicates an intensification of polemical propaganda designed to associate Khrushchev's approach with that of "imperialism" and to equate it to betrayal of the communist revolutionary cause.

23-24 OCTOBER

THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

Peking made no mention of the Cuban crisis until nearly 14 hours after President Kennedy's speech, when a domestic service broadcast datelined Havana

reported the mobilization of Cuba's armed forces. "Mithin only a few hours," the broadcast said, several hundred thousand men had been mobilized and "various mass organizations also have been mobilized in patriotic enthusiasm. The whole [Cuban] nation has arisen in a state of combat readiness to repulse any attack." The broadcast said nothing about the President's speech or the measures he announced. An NCMN report a short time later, in the same vein, created the impression that the United States was preparing for an attack on Cuba and that the Cuban people were making a heroic effort to repulse an invasion.

This picture was reinforced in Radio Pekine's first report on the President's speech-17 hours after it was made--and on the projected quarantine measures. Ignoring the reasons for the quarantine, Poking went on to cite a statement by a U.S. Refense Department spokessam on measures to enforce the blockade, and reported the deployment of "large numbers" of naval and air units to the Caribbean area "in the last few days."

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When Peking finally referred to the President's statement about the missile sites—in an NCNA report transmitted about three hours after Peking's first mention of the speech—it provided a much more explicit account than was contained in Soviet media: President Kennedy, NCNA said, used as a "pretext" for the blockade a claim that "la series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation' by the Soviet Union in Cuba 'to provide a nuclear strike capacity against the Western hemisphere.'" NCNA added that "in complete disregard of the fact that the United States is committing aggression against Cuba," the President "alleped that Cuba is being 'transformed into an important strategic base' which 'constitutes a direct threat to the peace and security of all the Americas.'" The NCNA account also itemized the President's seven initial steps, quoting that portion of his speech at length and in much greater detail than was provided in Soviet reports.

PEOPLE'S DALLY's militant 24 October editorial, entitled "Stop the New Imperialist Adventure," insisted on the rights of the Cuban "sovereign state" to build up its defense forces against U.S. "aggression" and "piracy." Conveying the CPR view of what was expected of the Soviet Union in the crisis, the editorial declared that

there is no doubt that the present struggle of the Cuban people against U.S. imperialist aggression, like the past ones, will enjoy the resolute support of the entire socialist camp and all peaceloving countries and peoples.

It went on to assert pointedly that the Chinese, for their part, "have always stood staunchly on the side of the Cuban people"—-and to reiterate that Cuba and its "great leader" would be backed up by "all" peaceloving countries and peoples. NCNA's account of the editorial did not mention the Soviet Union.

PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION OF QUARANTINE In announcing the imposition of the quarantine, an NCNA dispatch provided the most complete description in available bloc propaganda at that time of the proscribed items of cargo: "surface-to-surface missiles,

bomber aircraft, rockets and guided missiles...." NCNA was similarly explicit in an account of the Security Council session of 23 October, referring to U.S. demands "that the Council call for 'the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other offensive weapons," and reporting Zorin as having refuted U.S. Government "concoctions" that "so-called 'Soviet rocket bases' had been found in Cuba."

News stories on 23 and 24 October briefly noted the cancellation of leaves and suspension of routine demobilizations in the USSR, Marshal Grechko's instructions to the Warsaw Pact countries, and the Soviet Foreign Ministry's return of the U.S. note accompanying the "list of measures arbitrarily taken" to establish the quarantine.

25 OCTOBER

CPR GOVERNMENT

A CPR Government statement of 25 October,* widely broadcast by Peking, expressed "great indignation" and "strong protest against such outrageous piratical

action and serious war provocation of the U.S. imperialists," who had "revealed more and more their true colors." Tracing the recent history of U.S. "plots of aggression against Cuba," the statement described the U.S. "pretexts" for blockading Cuba as "totally absurd." In the face of such plots, "it is entirely mecessary for Cuba to strengthen its defense," the statement said. "What weapons" Cuba might have were a mmatter "entirely within Cuba's sovereigntv."

TREATMENT OF THE SOVIET GOVERN-MENT STATEMENT The CPR Government statement referred briefly to the statement issued by the Soviet Government the preceding day. Following a paragraph quoting militant statements by Castro ("the aggressors will

be exterminated"), and after avowing CPR support for Cuba and confidence that the Cubans under Castro "will certainly be able to smash the U.S. imperialist aggressive plot and war provocation," the statement spoke of worldwide support for Cuba and summed up the Soviet Government statement in one sentence:

The Government of the Soviet Union issued a statement on 23 October, pointing out that this act of aggression of the United States against Cuba entails extremely grave consequences, and declaring that the Soviet Union will do its best to smash the appressive schemes of the U.S. imperialist bloc and defend and strengthen world peace.

"The Chinese Government," the CPR statement continued, "fully supports the fust stand of the Soviet Government,"**

Released by NCNA at 2300 GMT on the 24th, 0700 hours 25 October Peking time.

^{**} It was on 24 October that IZVESTIYA published the text of the CPR's latest proposals to India on negotiation of the Sino-Indian border dispute, and on the 25th that both IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA came out with editorials preffering the Soviet Union's first public support—though carefully qualified support—of the CPR position in the dispute. PRAVDA's editorial, entitled "In the Interests of the Peoples, in the Name of Universal Peace," declared that continued Sino-Indian antagonism would benefit only imperialism and endorsed the latest CPR statement offering a three-point program as the basis for a negotiated settlement of the controversy. While condemning the position that preconditions should

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The 2,000-word Soviet statement was carried in full by NCNA in English for foreign recipients 14 hours after Moscow released it. A 300-word version was transmitted by NCNA to the Chinese press, and brief reports were broadcast in domestic service newscasts.

EDITORIAL COMMENT Peking comment continued to avoid acknowledging direct Soviet involvement in the crisis. An NCNA review of the Peking press described the statements

issued by governments of East European bloc countries only as "condemning the U.S. Government," not as supporting the Soviet position. NCMA reviewed a KWANGKING DAILY editorial which went even further than the CPR Government statement in minimizing attention to the Soviet stand. KWANGKING DAILY noted merely that a Soviet statement had been issued and added that "the Chinese Government and people" would support "the Cuban people."

TA KUNG PAO's 25 October editorial, dilating on the "recklessness of U.S. imperialism," declared that

the most urgent task before the people of the world is to discard any illusions about U.S. imperialism, heighten their vigilance, and strengthen their unity to struggle more staunchly against the U.S. imperialist policy of aggression and war.

The paper spoke of Cuba--as Peking commentators continued to do throughout the crisis--as symbolic of "oppressed nations and oppressed peoples of the world." It reiterated the CPR concept of imperialism as "a paper tiger" whose "arrogance today" is a sign of "inward weakness," not strength. And it pledged Cuba the support of the CPR and all peaceloving peoples in a struggle that was "an important part of the worldwide antiimperialist struggle."

KWANGMING DAILY pursued the theme that imperialism was "the most vicious enemy of world peace, of all the oppressed nations, and of the people

be satisfied before border discusions are initiated—a position India has taken—PRAVDA did not attack India specifically. The article's assertion that the "imperialists" are attempting to bring India and China "at loggerheads" and undermine "the friendship of the Soviet Union with fraternal China as well as friendly India" underscored the dilemma posed for the USSR by the Sino-Indian conflict. The editorial appealed for unity and internationalism to find a solution and thus to strike a blow at "the intrigues of the aggressive quarters of the United States which have recently undertaken a most dangerous adventure spearheaded not only against Cuba and the cocialist states but also against all peaceloving forces," Peking m.dia publicized the PRAVDA editorial, but not in full.

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of the whole world." It declared that the Cuban revolution "can never be crushed," stated that the whole socialist camp and "all" peacelowing peoples would back Cuba, and again pointedly asserted the CPR's consistent staunch support for the Cubans,

People's Liberation Army Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ching was quoted as declaring at a North Korean embassy banquet that the Cubans would "certainly have the courage and strength to defeat any outside blockade, subversion, and invasion," that they were "by no means isolated," and that the 550 million Chinese were "the most reliable comrades-in-arms of the Cuban people." The NCMA summary of Lo's remarks contained no reference to the Soviet thion.

Peking's external reporting on anti-U.S. reaction to the Cuban quarantine included numerous reports of opposition among Latin American countries and from leftist groups and newspapers in Indonesia, Pakistan, and Japan. NCNA filed a long report on the statements by the governments of Poland, Hungary, and Rumania on the crisis.

NCMA also reported a "blatant" U.S. Defense Department announcement that the United States would intercept foreign submarines "suspected of transporting offensive military material to Cuba." U.S. preparations "for an armed invasion of Cuba" were noted repeatedly. An NCMA dispatch quoting the London DALTY EXPERESS reported that "U-2's, flying high over Cuba, provided thousands of pictures," and that men of "the American special forces were parachuted secretly into Cuba weeks ago to collect on-the-spot information to support the U-2 spy pictures."

KHRUSHCHEV REPLY TO RUSSELL NCNA carried a summary of Khrushchev's message to Betrand Russell pledging to do everything possible to prevent thermonuclear war. It reported Khru-

shchev's assurance that the Soviet Government "would not permit itself to be provoked" and his statement that such a war would be thermonuclear; his call for the efforts of all bloc and other states to avert "a military catastrophe"; his warning that the Soviet Union would have to "resort to means of defense against the aggressor" to defend its rights under the U.N. Charter if the U.S. Government implemented "piractic" actions; his plea for U.S. restraint, and his broaching of the idea of a high-level meeting. There was no Pekine comment.

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CPR media continued to devote extensive propaganda to the crisis, but confined themselves largely to reportage of worldwide protests against the U.S. move. NCNA transmitted a lengthy summary of Marshal Malinovskiy's speech to the Soviet army ideological conference, as published in the 25 October EED STAR.

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Reportage beamed both to overseas and domestic audiences stressed, in highly selective passages gleaned from the Western press, alleged U.S. plans to follow up the blockade with a large-scale invasion of Cuba. The Peking domestic service emphasized reports of a military buildup in Florida in readiness for "armed invasion of Cuba." NCMA said that "the Kennedy administration insists on its war provocation against Cuba and is actively preparing for an armed invasion."

Castro's defiant TV speech was reported prominently in the 26 October Peking press.

27-30 OCTOBER

KHRUSHCHEV-KENNEDY EXCHANGES The 27 October exchange of messages between Khrushchev and the President was first acknowledged by Peking in a brief NCNA report at 1747 GMT on

NCNA's review of the 30 October press -- which re-

28 October, MCNA transmitted to domestic recipients a fairly long TASS report on Khrushchev's 27 October letter proposing a Turkish-for-Cuban bases trade; similar reportage was carried in the domestic service, and PEOPLE'S DAILY published the text of the letter.

Peking broadcast media gave Khrushchev's 28 October letter about the same publicity. A brief report of the decision to withdraw the missiles from Cuba appeared in PEOPLE'S DAILY of 29 October under the texts of the 27 October message exchange, and Radio Peking's domestic audiences were given short summaries of the decision on the same day. On 30 October the text was printed in PEOPLE'S DAILY, along with the President's reply, at the bottom of page three.

CASTRO'S DEMANDS

ported at the end of its section on Cuba that the paper had published Khrushchev's 28 October Letter--stated that the Peking press "gave prominence" to Castro's "important" statement of 28 October, which the Peking radio had also broadcast in full. NCNA and the domestic service subsequently carried items citing Cuban press and popular support for Castro's five points, and PEOPLE'S DAILY editorially supported them as "fully justified" and "absolutely necessary." NCNA noted that Raul Castro's speech in Santiago urging Cubans to be increasingly viligant was also "prominently reported" in the Chinese central press.

PENG CHEN RALLY SPEECH On 28 October, the Peking domestic service broadcast a speech by Politburo member Peng Chen giving authoritative expression to Communist China's attitude

toward Soviet handling of the crisis. The big pro-Cube cally at which Peng spoke was attended by Premier Chou En-lai, CCP Contral Committee - 7 -

Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping, Foreign Minister Chen I, PLA chief of staff Lo Jui-ching, and other members of the leadership. Peng Chen spoke of the "invincible" (Usan people's ability "to rely or their own valiant and ceaseless struggle, with support from people throughout the world," to "pulverize" the U.S. blockade and "war provocation." He declared pointedly that victory is determined by "the masses of workers and peasants, not the much-vaunted weapons of imperialists and reactionaries." He referred to the isolation of "imperialism and reactionaries" by the Cuban revolutionaries under the "correct leadership of Castro," and went on to review the "correct foreign policy" of China and Cuba, "Doth socialist countries."

Peng reiterated that the Chinese people would "remain the most faithful and reliable comrades-in-arms of the Cuban people," and promised that the CPR would "try by all possible means to support the struggle waged by the Cuban people until they win a final, thorough, and complete victory." Such support, Peng admonished, was incumbent on all socialist states:

It is an unshirkable international obligation of the peoples of the socialist camp, and of peaceloving nations and peoples throughout the world.

Peng saw U.S. "war provocation" against Cuba as an integral part of U.S. plans for "worldwide aggression and intensified preparation for war," and called it "particularly serious" that the United States was "continuously preparing military provocation and subversive activities against the Soviet Union, China, and the entire socialist camp in a vain attempt to undermine and eliminate the socialist camp." Peng made no other direct reference to the Soviet Union beyond a passing mention that statements on the crisis had been issued "by the Soviet Union, our nation, and other socialist countries."

Liu Ning-i also addressed the rally, likening Cuban to CPR revolutionary experience and declaring that history has repeatedly shown "the newly rising forces of the people [to be] all-triumphant."

A message to Castro from the rally reiterated the conviction that "the revolutionary will and unity of the oppressed people are the greatest and most reliable force;" and the assurance that the 650 million Chinese "will remain" the most reliable and faithful comrades-in-arms of the Cubans.

U.S. "INVASION" PLANS, CUBAN SELF-DEFENSE Commentaries continued to picture Cuba as heroically defending itself against imminent invasion from the United States. PEOPLE'S DAILY said editorially on 28 October that "responsible U.S. officials have

openly declared that to overthrow the Cuban revolutionary government

remains the fixed target of U.S. policy," It added that military forces had been strengthened at Guantanamo base, "where the U.S. forces are ready to fight at any moment." It was necessary for the Cuban people to strengthen their national defenses; they had "every right to decide what weapons they should use," and "no one else has the right to interfere."

Numerous Peking broadcasts on 29 October depicted feverish Cuban antiinvasion preparations. NCNA transmissions that day publicized the statements by Fidel and Raul Castro casting doubt on President Kennedy's assurance that the United States would not invade Cuba if Soviet missiles were withdrawn, and implying disatisfaction with the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement. Supporting the notion that the Cuban crisis had not been ended by the latest Soviet moves, NCNA on 29 October stated that "the U.S. bourgeois press and politicians have clamored that despite Soviet agreement to dismantle 'offensive' weapons..., the Cuban crisis is not over."

Broadcasts and NCNA dispatches the following day included frequent references to Cuban defense preparations and to "aggressive" U.S. plans: NCNA reported that the Fresident had ordered the blockade fleet to remain in position "while the United States was taking aggressive steps over the Cuban question, and was still planning armed invasion." The agency cited as documentation the President's continuing meetings with the National Security Council and other advisers, the Florida military buildup, Secretary Rusk's "allegations" that the Cuban Government was connected with the dynamiting of a Venezuelan power station, and stepped-up activities of Cuban exiles.

CUBAN SELF-

Repeating that the "Cuban revolution" can "survive on its own resources," a 30 October editorial in the Peking MORKERS DAILY claimed that the Cuban people it of their revolutionary cause and of "their own might."

were fully confident of their revolutionary cause and of "their own might." The 28 October PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial had said that the "Cuban people" would surely be able to defeat any new "U.S. aggression," and TA KUNG PAO's 29 October editorial stressed the Chinese people's conviction that

the Cuban people, who have won their revolution by relying on their own resources, will certainly be able to safeguard their revolutionary gains by relying on themselves.

In this context, the paper commended the Chinese example to the Cubans, pointing out that the CPR itself had successfully withstood a U.S. blockade.

SUPPORT FOR CUBAN PEOPLE Peking continued to reaffirm CPR support for the Cuban cause, declaring, in the words of the 29 October TA KUNG PAO editorial, that the Chinese people regarded

it as "their sacred international obligation" to give all possible aid to the Cuban revolution and that they "will remain steadfast to the Cuban

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people, whatever storms the U.S. imperialists raise." The CPR press, according to NCMA, frontpaged pledges of "firm support" for the Cubans made at a rally in Shenyang and expressed by various mass organizations.

Peking continued pointedly to omit mention of Soviet support for Cuba in picturing massive worldwide backing of the Cuban people. PEOPLE'S DAILY of 30 October rounded up worldwide protests against U.S. "War provocations," while other papers noted support for the Cubans in Algeria, East Germany, Cambodia, Mongolia, Uruguay, and Brazil. Peking broadcasts to the Arab world on 29 and 30 October reported widespread support in North Africa and cited an Algerian paper as cautioning that "surrender in the present circumstances will encourage imperialism... and will mean retreat until the end."

In publicizing the support of other Latin American nations, Peking drew a distinction between the "peoples" of these nations and the "ruling circles." Thus a 30 October NCNA dispatch said that in some countries the fight against U.S. aggression had been closely linked with the struggle against the rule of pro-American reactionary forces, and added that 30,000 people demonstrated in Hontevideo "against the U.S. blockade... and the Uruguayan Government...decision to support the anti-Cuban policy" of the United States.

The OAS vote against Cuba was portrayed in Peking media as the result of U.S. "blackmail." NGA, pointing to reservations against U.S. "armedia intervention" in Cuba voiced by such povernments as Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, and Uruguay, stated that "threats and bribery" were factors which must be taken into consideration when assessing the attitude of Latin American coun ries toward Washington. It cited Argentine papers to the effect that as a result of Argentina's vote in support of the Cuban blockade, the United States had agreed to a postponement of the repayment of Argentina's debts. Similarly, Brazil was said by NCNA to have been threatened with a reduction in its coffee export quota unless its policy of nonintervention in Cuba was altered.

31 OCTOBER - 1 NOVEMBER

PEOPLE'S DAILY'S 31 October editorial was entitled "Defend the Cuban Revolution." The editorial began by noting that after Khrushchev announced the decision to withdraw "the so-called 'offensive weapons' from Cuba," the "chief of U.S. imperialism' indicated that the United States would agree to remove the blockade 'immediately and give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. "In no circumstances," the paper warned, can the people of the world trust "the empty promises of the U.S. aggressor."

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The editorial emphatically supported Castro's demands and applauded Cuba for "refusing all unreasonable claims infringing upon Cuba's sovereignty." It declared that the United States and its "mouthpieces" were "declaring boastfully that by his 'firmness' Kennedy had scored a "major triumph'"--precisely the claims Soviet propagand was making in regard to Khrushchev's actions. It lauded the people of Cuba for "defending the honor of being a socialist country"--another unqualified crediting of "socialist" status to Cuba--and concluded with a portrayal of militant CPR support for a Cuban stand that epitomized "revolutionary strugele" worldwide.

PEOPLE'S DALLY on the 31st frontpaged Havana-datelined reports on unanimous Cuban endersement of Castro's 28 October statement and on Castro's Inspection of combat-ready Cuban military units. Prominence was given rallies held in Shamghai, Tientsin, Wuhan, and Canton in support of "Cuba's struggle against U.S. war provocation." Mounting protest was pictured in other Latin American countries; and protest meetings in Norch Korea, Mongolia, and Albania, as well as pro-Cuba "public opinion" in Asia and Africa were reported under the headline "Heroic Cuba Is An Example for the Struggle of All Peoples."

NCNA supplemented this picture with reportage of newspaper support for Cuba in Burma and Pakistan, popular support in Ceylon, and a denunciation of "U.S. aggression" by Venezuelan workers. A 31 October NCNA dispatch on protests at home, entitled "Storm of Anger Sweeps China at U.S. War Provocations Against Cuba," reported that news of CPR mass rallies was being relayed by radio and TV to "every corner of the country."

U THANT MISSION, U.N. ROLE NCNA reportage on 31 October foreshadowed open denunciation of the U.N. role that was to appear in authoritative Peking comment the following day. Thus

in reporting on remarks made the preceding day by Edwin Martin, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, NCMA said the United States would apply pressure both by threats and through the "direct New York talks with...U Thant." Another NCMA dispatch cited a Pakistani paper to the effect that the world's confidence in the "birted Nations as an instrument of peace had already been impaired by the organization's repeated "failures to act effectively against aggression."

NCNA noted U Thant's arrival in and departure from Havana, and briefly reported his two meetings with Castro. According to NCNA, the purpose of the first meeting was to discuss "Cuban demands." A 31 October NCNA dispatch datelined Havana, stressing Cuban support for Castro's five-point statement, said that Cuban citizens had posted slogans to this effect at the airport before U Thant's arrival.

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CHEN I NOTE

The United Nations was directly denounced in authoritative comment on 1 November, and the propaganda took on a more blatantly polemical cast, CPR Foreign Minister Chen I's note to the Cuban charge d'affaires in Peking, broadcast in the Peking home service on 1 November, contained a thinly veiled indictment of the Soviet Union for its willingness to sacrifice Cuban interests for the sake of its own security. Directed ostensibly at "U.S. spokesmen" only. Chen's profession of anger that Cuban demands should not be regarded as a factor in the settlement of a crisis "among the big powers" was clearly aimed at a broader target. Denouncing this as an "imperialist" viewpoint. Chen asserted that the destiny of Cuba is in the hands of the Cuban people "and not in the hands of any other country."

Chen declared that Cuban independence and sovereignty "absolutely" cannot be negotiated. He reiterated the Chinese communist thesis that man. not weapons, is the "deciding" factor in the revolutionary struggle, Recalling, as in earlier propaganda, that the Cuban revolution began with only seven rifles, he asserted that the Cubans can defeat the "outwardly strong aggressor."

DATEY COMMENT

RED FLAG, TA KUNG This line reappeared in a RED FLAG article on Cuba. PAO, KWANGMING which said that in the final analysis imperialists and reactionaries are only "paper tigers," and that by reliance on revolutionary struggle one can avoid

being cowed by U.S. military pressure or "deceived by flowery words." TA KUNG PAO's 1 November editorial reiterated the "paper tiger" thesis in declaring that "the U.S. imperialist aggressor is only outwardly strong,"

RED FLAG's 1 November article, carried in both domestic and foreignlanguage Peking broadcasts on 31 October, expanded on the theme in asking rhetorically what strength the oppressed nations depend upon for their liberation and for the safeguarding of their revolutions. RED FLAG said that this is "an important question of principle, and for Marxist" Leninists the answer has always been that the masses of the people will depend only upon their own strength to liberate themselves." It noted CPR and "socialist" -- but not Soviet -- support for the Cuban people's cause, and avowed faith in the Cubans' ability to defend their revolution.

In keeping with RED FLAG's comment that reliance on "people's revolutionary struggle" will prevent "being deceived by flowery words," TA KUNG PAO reiterated the implicit reproof to the Soviet Union: "No revolutionary people," the paper said, will be deceived by the President's assurances about not invading Cuba, TA KUNG PAC's editorial, as reviewed by NCNA, repeated that Cuba's destiny lies with its own people. It endorsed Castro's five demands as just and "necessary" and made even more pointed

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Chen I's complaint about "big power" negotiations over the heads of the Cubans: "No country or international organization is entitled to intervene in the domestic affairs of Cuba. Neither the United States nor the United Nations has such right."

The paper concluded with another portrayal of the Cuban struggle as symbolic: The Cubans are

not only safeguarding the independence and sovereignty of Cuba and their own revolutionary gains, but are also defending the peace of the Caribbean Sea and the whole world, upholding the prestige of a socialist state, and giving encountgement to the just anti-imperialist struggles waged by the revolutionary people in all parts of the world.

EXAMENTING DAILY's editorial on 1 November contained further censure of the U.N. role ("the Kennedy powerment is trying to interfere, through the United Nations, with the independence and sovereignty of Cuba") and a further plode that the Chinese people "will do everything in their power to back up the Cuban people." Like TY KHING PAO, it endersed Castro's demands. It said the Cuban people not only have the right but "the urgent need" to strengthen their armed ferces, and referred to a U.S. offers to "deprive Cuba of its strategic-defensive Meapens," It called the Precident's "safeguards"—the question marks are UCLA's—a Georgiticn. And it concluded, again echoing Peng Chen, with another implicit robuff to the Soviet approach

Mistory has proved, and will continue to prove, that the course of history is determined by an awakened pecale, who have armed themselves and have the course to fight and win, and not by weapons which the imperialists and reactionaries deem all-powerful.

The message to Castro from the 28 October rell; had similarly declared . that the "peoples" constituted a force which "cannot be destroyed by any meapon." Throughout the crisis, CPP comment—including the povernment statement of 20 October—penerally referred to the U.S. "wan provocation" and "threats to world peace," rather than specifying a danger of thermonuclear war. In one of the infrequent CPP references to thermonuclear war in this context, the 31 October PDOPLE'S DAILY editorial said that "no matter how fercelously U.S. imperialism rattles its saber and even threatens to launch a nuclear war," the "heroic Cuban people" cannot be shaken.

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SATELLITE MEDIA

I. THE EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITES

23-24 OCTOBER

The first monitored East European satellite report of the U.S. ect. 0. was a Czechoslovak broadcast announcing that Washington had declared a military blockade of Cuba. Prague said that "Kennedy tried to defend his decision by the clumpy assertion that Soviet launching bases for medium-range rockets are under construction in Cuba." The broadcast declared that this "slander" had already been suitably answered by the USSR, which said it had no need for such bases because of its com "reliable intercontinental rockets." Warsaw, also acknowledging the bases issue, called President Kennedy's charge "absurd and provocative."

Later broadcasts from Prague and other satellite radios gave primary attention to dangers posed by the quarantine. Prague asserted that the "sco.es" of nations which ship goods to and from Havana "cannot permit a foreign power to arbitrarily usurp the right to control their ships in frae waters." Sofia said that President Kennedy "tried quite unconvincingly" to draw a distinction between a blockade and a quarantine. The Sofia broadcast claimed that all the U.S. "propaganda" was based on the "completely unfounded allegation" that the Sowiet Union was creating a danger to peace; Sofia suprested similarity between rocket bases the USSR might have in Cuba and those the United States definitely had in Turkey and Italy.

East Berlin, in several news reports on the Cuben situation, called the U.S. measures "an extremely serious threat to world peace" and a "crass violation of the norms of international law." East Berlin also quoted the Cuban representative in the GDR, Andres Soler, as saying that the United States could not intimidate Cuba, which was "counting on the solidarity with the GDR, the Soviet Union, and other socialist and friendly countries."

Satellite transmitters stressed the "danger" and "recklessness" of the U.S. measures. While Moscow propagandists avoided specific address to the President's statements about Soviet construction of medium— and intermediate-range missile bases in Cuba, satellite radios widely branded these statements "absurd" and "provocative"—a "pretext" for efforts to liquidate the Castro regime.

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Commentator Karl Friedrich Reinhardt, in a talk over the East Berlin domestic service, referred to the 'invented new statement that the Soviet Union has installed long-range missiles for offensive nuclear rockets in Cuba," The commentator went on to quote McGeorge Bundy as his authority for stating that "the terms 'offensive' and 'defensive' are misleading; whether a rifle is offensive or defensive depends on what one is after, what one has in mind." Reinhardt said that the weapons the USRR had delivered to Cuba were similar to military assistance given to such neutrais as the JAR and Indomesia and could be compared with the U.S. Nike or Matador, with a "range of about 10 to 15 miss."

East European transmitters unanimously endorsed the Soviet "warning" to the United States, expressed solidarity with the Cuben people, and warned that the United States must bear full responsibility for the possible "grave consequences" of its action. The quarantine, referred to most frequently as a "blockade," was described as an open violation of invernational law, naked aggression against Cuba, and a serious threat to world peace and security.

CZECHOSLOVÁK GOVERNMENT STATEMENT A Czechoslovak Government statement on 23 October characterized the quarantine as an "openly aggressive act" and a "piratical action" in open preparation for the unleashing of a general conflict. The state-

ment expressed hope that the U.S. Government would "in time realize the danger of playing with fire," and supported 'without reservation' the Soviet starament and U.M. Security Countil discussion of the matter. A RUDE PRAVO article said the President was returning to the 'notorious policy of Drinkmanship' with a "boilness surpassing that of all of his predecessors." Other satellite commentators frequently referred to John Foster Dulies and the policy of brinkmanship and declared that the President's failure to gain his ends through resort to a "positions of strength" policy would come much soomer than did that of Dulles. Prague's government statement declared that "the time has freveously passed when the U.S. imperialists, relying on their allitary power, could dictate their will to freedom-loving mations with impunity."

Eist German commentators described as "Laughable" the notion that Cuba was a threat to U.S. security, and declared that the existence of U.S. bases all over the world "unmasks Fennedy's fine reasons for his act of aggression as downright ludicrous." Calling for a worldwide protest against the U.S. blockade to "force the United States to desist from its dangerous course," East Berlin broadcasts gave considerable attention to reports of adverse reaction abroad, especially in nations allied with the United States. East European radios generally played up demonstrations in Britain and Western countries opposing the U.S. action; and the quasiclandestine community radio 'Ogg: in Itaila' said that

Italian Premier Fanfani "in an elaborate and embarrassed way declares his solidarity" with U.S. leaders, but "is certainly far from interpreting the feelings and traditions of the Italian people."

East Berlin reported promptly that the Bonn Government had endorsed the U.S. action. It remarked frequently thereafter that "only Bonn" had offered full support to the U.S. "aggressors," and less frequently referred to the "isolation" of the United States in its attitude toward Cuba. Adolph Herlitzka, in the East Berlin domestic service, suggested that the "monstrous deployment of troops and naval forces" was addressed not really to Cuba but rather to the other Latin American countries, "some of which are very much in symmathy with Cuba."

The satellite radios ignored the OAS meeting of 23 October and its virtually unanimous endorsement of the American measures. The East German ADN raported under a Havana dateline on 23 October that "Latin America is standing at the rim of a volcano about to erupt, against which Kennedy's blockade will prove to be powerless."

Poland's heavy coverage emphasized unfavorable world reaction, with special attention to opposition in Britain. One domestic commentary said the speech "aroused serious doubts" in London, and another claimed that a majority of British papers "neoatively appraised" the Kennedy speech.

BULGARIAN, HUNGARIAN, RUMANIAN OFFICIAL STATEMENTS

Bulgaria, like Czechoslovakia, issued a government statement on the 23d, accusing the United States of "gross violation of international law and the principles of the U.N. Charter."

The statement called the President's address "unprecedented in peacetime" and expressed full support for the Soviet stand, A Sofia broadcast in Greek said that the "artificial war hysteria" created by the President's statement was possibly for election campaign reasons, although it could lead the world to the abyse of nuclear destruction, (An isolated Prague commentary similarly suggested that the President had sought only propagand and political eains.)

Rumania was slow to report the President's speech, remaining silent on it for 15 hours. Comment from Hungary was also limited. But on 24 October Hungary and Rumania followed the lead of Czechoslovakia and Bulparia in issuing government statements supporting the Soviet statement and urging effective U.N. action to dissuade the United States from its "warlike action." Hungary's Janos Kadar issued a statement for Ouba journalists which generally followed the line of the government statement. One Budapest broadcast, in Arabic, asserted that the U.S. action had removed the cold war campaign from the realm of mere "verbal exchanges" and had turned it into a "real hell, namely war." President

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Kennedy's action, the commentary said, violated international law and brought the world "to the brink of an abyss."

FIRST TIRANA

Albania's first reaction, like Rumania's, was limited to reportage, with editorial comment interjected.

The first monitored commentary from Tirana ridiculed

what it called a U.S. charge that Cuba was an aggressor, calling this unthinkable, and condemmed the United States for "preparing another agression against Cuba." The Tirana domestic service commentary failed to make any mention of the 23 October Soviet Government statement. On 24 October, straining to avoid mentioning the USSR, Tirana ridiculed what it described as a U.S. charge that Cuba was being turned into "a military base of the socialist countries."

25 OCTOBER

POLISH GOVERN-

Poland on 25 October followed Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria in issuing a government statement condemning the quarantine and supporting

the USSR statement. The Polish statement, which dealt at length with the alleged illegalities of the U.S. position, warned that Poland would "draw all necessary conclusions" in the event that "the rights of the Polish flag are violated."

Although initial East European comment acknowledged the President's references to Soviet rocket bases in Cuba, disparagingly but stopping short of unequivocal denial, subsequent propaganda largely avoided direct mention of this point and dwelled almost exclusively on the general theme of U.S. aggression against Cuba, The Polish statement, ignoring the issue of Soviet weapons in Cuba, referred to the United States' "extensive network of bases and rocket launching pads directed against the socialist countries."

Prague's CTK on 25 October carried a Warsaw-datelined dispatch stating that "crews of Polish ships have decided that regardless of U.S. piracy they will continue normal operations of Cuban shipping rottes."

BLAS ROCA SPEECH East European media continued to carry extensive reports of solidarity meetings and support for Cuba. East Berlin gave heavy coverage to a Cuba solidarity rally outside East Berlin at which Cuban ORI leader Blas Roca and SED Politburo member Paul Verner spoke. Blas Roca told the rally: "We have received

member Paul Verner spoke. Blas Roca told the rally: "We have received Soviet arms. I think that we shall continue to receive them, and we intend to continue to arm ourselves." He said Cuba would be 100 times - 17 -

stronger if another U.S. invasion were attempted. He declared that "we have armed ourselves exclusively to defend ourselves against North American aggression." And he pointed out that Cuba was not alone. being supported by "the great and invincible socialist camp headed by the great and invincible power, the USSR." Blas Roca indicated that although the U.S. "imperialists" were "arrogant, aggressive, and reactionary." the Cubans "are ready to negotiate with them,

PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Vaclav David was GDR COMMENT quoted by the Prague radio as asserting that the "firm and calm" reaction of the USSR, the socialist

camp, and Cuba were "proof" of the widespread condemnation of the U.S. action. Budapest radio said the world had "perhaps never before seen" as clearly as now the "acute contrast" between the "features of the international political poles," between "irresponsible playing with fire on one side" and "sober calm on the other." An East Berlin commentator hailed Soviet "circumspection" which, he said, was "in striking contrast to the American step of insanity."

The GDR, however, alone among the European satellites, failed to issue a government statement.

COMMENT, GOVERN-MENT STATEMENT

ALBANIAN EDITORIAL Where on 24 October Tirana had ignored the Soviet Union's involvement entirely, ZERI I POPULLIT's 25 October editorial declared that the President in his "warmongering speech" had not only "not con-

cealed his intention of a military attack against revolutionary Cuba," but had "also directly threatened the Soviet Union." Later the editorial pictured the Albanians as "united with the heroic Cuban people, the Soviet people [the editorial did not mention the Soviet Government statement], and all the other peoples of the countries of the socialist camp" in protesting against "imperialism" and defending Cuba.

ZERI I POPULLIT insisted that "it is not Cuba which threatens the United States or any other country, but the Cuban revolution." The United States, it added. "wants to liquidate this brilliant example." ZERI I POPULLIT accused "U.S. propaganda" of "trying to distort the correct self-defense measures of the Cuban revolutionary government." It pictured U.S. aggression against Cuba as an integral part of a U.S. "aggressive policy against the peoples and against peace." It proclaimed solidarity with the Cuban people's "just cause" as a "sacred duty for all peaceloving mankind" (echoing the CPR line), and declared that Cuba would be victorious because

there is no force in the world to defeat a people determined to the point of death to defend their freedom, independence, and socialist revolution. The

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Cuban people are aroused and, with arms in their hands, are ready to face and destroy the new imperialist aggression.

Late on 25 October Albania issued a government statement making no mention of the Soviet Union-or of any other communist country by name, The statement referred to "the absurd [U.S.] pretext alleging that an aggressive military force is being created in Cuba which endangers the United States and the whole Western hemisphere." And it declared that "the Albanian people and the Government of the Albanian People's Republic express their internationalist and unshakable solidarity with the Cuban republic," It repeatedly stressed Albania's support for the Cuban people in the company of "all socialist countries." In pointed language, it pledged that

the people of Albania, a member of the socialist camp, will be, as always, in full solidarity with all the socialist countries against the aggressive activities of American imperialism and its allies,

And it echoed the CPR view of what was expected of a good "socialist state" in the crisis: Albania, the statement said, "is convinced that peaceloving peoples and nations will rise to defend Cuba,"

26 OCTOBER

The Soviet-oriented satellite media maintained a heavy flow of comment denouncing the U.S. quarantine action, but emphasis appeared to be turning from almost unrelieved denunciation of the United States to praise for the Soviet Union's "calm" and "peaceful" response to the U.S. move. Khrushchev's letter to Bertrand Russell was widely reported by all the satellites except Albania, although commentaries did not emphasize the call for a high-level conference. The letter was cited most often as pointing up a "sharp contrast" between the President's "aggressive" actions and Khrushchev's "peaceful" ones. Prague radio exclaimed: "In what sharp contrast" to "Kennedy's hazardous game" is the "responsible and reasonable" Soviet attitude, which is in defense of peace and U.N. principles "such as the settlement of controversial issues by negotiations," "Can one improve," it asked, on the action of Khrushchev who, "despite the offending behavior of the U.S. Government, proposes a symmit meeting?"

In an unusual allusion to speculation in the United States about possible Soviet counteraction in Berlin, one Prague broadcast said that "the Penzagon expected, at the least, that its provocative attitude toward Cuba and threats to *hipping on the high seas would provoke the USSR into a military solution of the West Berlin problem." The importance of U.N. deliberations on the dispute was played up, and Czech and East German commentators asserted that the present issue posed for the United Nations its most vital moment and "severest test."

Other satellite comment set out to offset any notion that Soviet "calmness" might be a sign of weakness. The Hungarian NEFSCABADSAG asserted, for example, that "awareness of tremendous strength is the explanation of the calmness that emanates from the Soviet statement."

"RASH VIEWS"
ACKNOWLEDGED

A Prague domestic service talk on 26 October, by commentators Kucera and Novotny, indicated that discordant views had manifested themselves over the

proper Soviet response to the quarantine: Noting that a tendency not to aggravate the situation "is becoming more and more apparent," Novotny said that "earlier there appeared many rash views that the Soviet ships, regardless of the situation and its development, ought to sail through at any price and at once. I repeat: at any price and at once." The commentators declared that "more and more compromise proposals are appearing, and it would be foolish and politically wrong to aggravate the situation by some isolated conflicts. This would only help those in the West who anticipate rash reactions from us."

27-31 OCTOBER

Khrushchev's 27 October Turkish-for-Cuban bases proposal indicated the USSR's willingness, Radio Warsaw said, "to meet the United States more than halfway." According to Warsaw, the attitude which Washington adopted would show up its intentions when it ordered the blockade of Cuba. The Polish radio claimed that the USSR's latest proposal had a "pronounced effect" in the United States, with both radio and TV stations interrupting their programs to give detailed reports of the Soviet suggestion.

East Germany's First Deputy Foreign Minister Otto Winzer was quoted by ADN as saying that Khrushchev's proposal demonstrated the USSR's "far-reaching preparedness for an understanding."

Both the 27 and 28 October Khrushchev letters were well publicized by the Soviet-oriented satellites. The propaganda reaction to the letter of the 28th and the President's response combined expressions of relief at the lessening of tension with approbation for khrushchev's "victory for peace," as a result of which the U.S. had "been compelled" to give up the quarantine and renounce invasion of Cuba.

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BULGAR IAN COMMENT The Bulgarian news agency BTA reported, in a 28 October English-language broadcast, that domestic radio programs were interrupted several times for

bulleting on the Khrushchev Letter and the President's statement, and that the populace greeted the news "with interest, satisfaction, and reilef," Sofia radio, rationalizing that the Soviet ain was "to defend Cuba and preserve peace," quoted RABOTNICHEKKO DELO as saying that the return of Soviet "equipment" from Cuba was "natural and justified," As in other bloc comment, the paper saw Khrushchev's action as stemming from President Kennedy's "guarantee of the inviolability of Cuba,"

REFERENCE TO "HOTHEADS"

RABOTNICHESKO DELO's editorial on 29 October, stressing the importance of the President's "guarantees" against invasion of Cuba, hinted at the existence of some discount and the stress of the stress

approbation of the Soviet action: "If there are still some hotheads," it said, "they must understand that the Soviet Union is taking these measures because the immunity of Cuba is guaranteed."

Am editorial in the Sofia ZEMEDEISKO ZMANE on 30 October noted approvingly that the Soviet Union "did not give in" but "gave a quiet response to the insolent challenge." Sofia further underscored its endorsement of Khrushchev's action—though indirectly—by belatedly broadcasting, on the evening of 30 October, an 8 October interview with Party First Secretary Zhivkov in which he stressed "wholehearted" Bulgarian support for Soviet proposals in the current session of the U.N. General Assembly.

CZECHOSŁOVAK COMMENT The Czechoslovak press agency CTK reported that the 30 October RUDE PRAVO paid tribute to "the tremendous peace endeavors of the Soviet Union," CTK quoted

PRACE, the trade union paper, to the effect that the United States had at last "beer compelled" to renounce armed attack against Cuba.

EAST GERMAN COMMENT East German reaction was slower in coming and harsher in tone than the Bulgarian and Czech. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, according to ADM, headlined the news: "A powerful

world protest forces the United States to renounce aggression. Reporting favorable world reaction to Khrushchev's move, ADN noted: "After days of great tension, during which the world was pushed to the brink of a nuclear war by the aggressive measures of the United States, a great sigh of relief is being breathed throughout the world." However, Deutschlandsender suggested it might be quite difficult for President Kennedy to keep his end of the bargain, what with the "endless plotting" against the Castro regime occupying the thoughts of Cuban counterrevolutionaries and certain Latin American "dictators." In 29 October comment, Deutschlandsender pointed out that only if the President made good his assurances,

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would it be possible to use "this rising tide of detente" to deal "with the most burning issues," especially "the foremost world problem--total and controlled international disarmament," While not specifying the Berlin problem, the commentator saw the possibility of a rapprochement "on all these questions,"

Late on 29 October, East German broadcasts spoke gloatingly of "adventurers" who through their own fault "lose their nerve completely," and the 30 October NEUES DEUTSCHLAND asserted that the United States "has been unmasked as the worst enemy of freedom and self-determination of nations." Like PRAVDA of the same date, the editorial stressed that the danger of invasion was not yet past, adding that "extremists" in the United States and "their cronies in Bonn" had not yet resigned themselves on this score.

HUNGARIAN, POLISH, Hungarian, Polish, and Rumanian comment was smaller in volume but similar in tone to Bulgarian and

Czech. Budapest radio pointed up a need for the United States to match the Soviet Union's peaceful gesture with concrete measures: "President Kennedy's promise has so far not been proved by deeds," it said, adding that "the Soviet Premier allowed no delay on his part in taking the necessary steps." The weapons which the President regarded as objectionable, Budapest asserted, would never have appeared in Cuba had not that country been threatened ceaselessly with foreign intervention. Press comment of 29 October, according to Budapest, emphasized relief at the satisfactory outcome of the crisis. MAGYAR NEMZET was reported as saving that the U.S. blockade necessitated "precautionary measures" by the Warsaw Pact states, but that "this does not mean that we have abandoned our principles"--seeming to imply some Warsaw Pact participation in the Soviet decisions. A later Budapest broadcast said that Khrushchev, U Thant, and Bertrand Russell had done the most to preserve peace, but added that "it is not impossible that in assessing the efforts aimed at averting war, President Kennedy's name will also be mentioned in history."

The 30 October TRYBUNA LUDU was reported by Warsaw PAP, in an English transmission, as welcoming the increased possibility of solving other East-West differences through negotiation. The paper's reference to U.S. bases in Turkey and the "problem" of West Germany as an "outpost of aggression" was one of the few instances in satellite comment of an effort to draw a connection between the Cuban crisis and the Berlin question.

The Bucharest radio, after broadcasting the text of Khrushchev's 28 October message and the President's rejection of Khrushchev's 27 October proposal, foliowed up on 29 October with comment praising the latest Soviet message.

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ALBANIAN REACTION The Tirana radio on 29 October carried only brief TASS reports on the 28 October exchange of messages, after noting tersely on 28 October that the Western

press "considers this move a victory for U.S. diplomacy." On 30 October, Tirana broadcast the text of a ZERI I POPULLI editorial which-ignoring Khrushchev-delivered a blistering attack on President Kennedy for "pushing humanity to the brink of the abyss." The editorial asserted that the President said that, to save West Berlin, he "would not hesitate to use the atomic bomb, if necessary, in the Caribbean, in Berlin, or anywhere else." While Khrushchev's 27 October Cuba-Turkey bases trade letter was promptly broadcast textually by Tirana the same day, it was not until 30 October, according to the Tirana press review, that the press published texts of the President's 27 October message and both 28 October messages, as well as Fidel Castro's statement that he found the "guarantees" inadequate. Tirana newscasts of 30 October also reported a TA KUNG PAO editorial describing the Peking rally for solidarity with Cuba.

A Tirana radio commentary on 1 November, listing recent U.S. "aggressive" measures against Cuba, remarked;

Why all this? Because, according to Kennedy, offensive weapons which threaten the security of the United States were established on Cuban territory. When Nikita Khrushchev then announced the decision to withdraw the strategic defensive weapons from Cuban territory, Kennedy promised, on his word of honor, to lift the blockade and not invade Cuba. But what happened to the so-called word of honor?

The radio went on to expound on the "untrustworthiness" of "imperialism":

Do the Cubans then not have the right to think that this was only a ruse to obtain the withdrawal of strategic weapons so that Cuba could be attacked easily? On what basis, then, can one rely on imperialism? Can one trust Kennedy? The Cuban people know from their own experience--the experience of the Bay of Pigs and of all that is happening about them--that Kennedy and the imperialist monopolies represented by Kennedy cannot be trusted,

Since the "U.S. imperialists" want to impose their own conditions on other peoples, the commentary continued, "it is obvious why the Cuban people and all the other peoples of the world" do not trust "Kennedy and his associates." It reiterated that "no illusion whatever can be harbored in this situation about Kennedy's good intentions and his understanding of the problems of

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peace," Tirana insisted, as Peking did, that the Cubans' confidence in victory was not provided for them "by any extraordinary weapon"; their most powerful weapon was their "great courage," The Albanian people, "comrades-in-arms," were on the side of the Cuban people.

II. THE FAR EASTERN SATELLITES

A DPRK Government statement, issued on 25 October. NORTH KOREA resembled the Albanian statement in its failure to

mention any communist country other than Cuba and itself, expressing the Korean people's solidarity with the Cuban peoples and noting the support of the bloc generally as "the peoples of the countries of the mighty socialist camp and the world's peaceloving peoples." The statement described the United States as "mankind's most vicious enemy and wrecker of peace," and spoke in Peking-like language of "the nefarious hypocritical nature and brigandish true colors of the Kennedy administration."

Pyongyang propaganda followed the CPR line of avoiding acknowledgment of Soviet involvement. A lengthy summary of a NODONG SINMUN editorial made only one mention of the Soviet Union, and this as a straight report of the fact that a Soviet statement had been issued and that it had promised all efforts to curb U.S. "aggressive" schemes. Avoiding any mention of the reason for the blockade, the editorial asserted that it was "long and carefully planned," and was taken after the President had received "the right of a hangman from Congress." Reports of North Korean rallies in support of Cuba, carried by KCNA, protested the "unscrupulous" and "shameless" U.S. "schemes for aggression" against Cuba.

Through 31 October, available Pyongyang comment failed to mention the Soviet or U.S. messages, or any easing of the crisis. The radio reported protest meetings in support of Cuba, including bellicose anti-U.S. speeches by the Cuban ambassador to North Korea, Lazaro Vigoa. At a 26 October rally reported by KCNA, the chief Korean speaker, Ha Ang-chon, candidate member of the political committee of the KWP Central Committee, reiterated the CPR argument that it was Cuba's "inviolable internal affair" to take any defensive measures in its territory, "and no one has any right to interfere with it." In his report to the rally, Ha made no reference to the Soviet Union or to the Kennedy-Khrushchev messages.

NORTH VIETNAM. MONGOL I A

The Hanoi radio, which mentioned briefly on 23 October that the President had made a speech in which he officially announced the "complete blockade of Cuba," on the following day reported the Soviet statement in a Lao broadcast.

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DISARMAMENT: CUBAN CRISIS DEMONSTRATES NEED FOR SPEEDY SETTLEMENT

Resumption of the 18-nation Geneva conference on 26 November occasions only a moderate increase in Moscow's attention to the disarmament and test-ban issues, which has remained at a low level since the recess of the conference on 7 September. Soviet spokesmen repeatedly cite the near disaster of the Cuban crisis as dramatic evidence of the urgency of a disarmament agreement. Declaring that the Cuban settlement demonstrated the value of approaching East-West problems in a spirit of compromise and mutual concessions, propagandists make clear that the next move in disarmament is up to the West. Gromyko's 21 September modification of the Soviet proposal for the destruction of all nuclear carriers in the first stage of general disarmament is repeatedly cited as evidence of Soviet readiness to compromise, and commentators complain that no

Despite repeated assertions that the positions of East and West on the test-bam question "are not far apart," Soviet spokesmen continue to reject Western demands for on-site inspection to detect underground tests. At the same time, the British decision to conduct an underground nuclear test in Nevada is seen as further evidence that the West is deliberated blocking an agreement in order to continue the arms race. Other partial disarmament measures receive only sporadic attention, although Tearapkin remarked at the resumed Geneva sessions that such measures constitute one of the "main questions" to be dealt with at the conference.

Moscow Stresses Soviet "Compromises" in General Pisarmament

Assertions that a disarmament agreement must be reached in order to save mankind from a thermonuclear catastrophe include that by Kuusinen in his 21 November speech at the Hungarian party congress. Following his polemical defense of Soviet agreement to "mutual compromise" in the Cuban question, Kuusinen declared that "disarmament is the imperious demand of our epoch," and that only disarmament can insure a truly stable, peaceful coexistence. Declaring that the "imperialists" are creating various obstacles to implementation of general disarmament, Kuusinen said that the USSR is ready to discuss "mny constructive proposals" which would bring disarmament closer. (He did not, however, mention the Geneva conference, scheduled to resume five days after he spoke.)

Soviet propagandists' stress on the urgency of disarmament in the wake of the Cuban crisis is typified by a 27 November Latyshev commentary which says the resolution of that conflict by "mutual compromises" has

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
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A NHAN DAN editorial carried in the Hanoi domestic service referred to the Soviet statement in one sentence, adding that "people throughout the world warmly support" the Soviet stand. NHAN DAN called the quarantine an "insolent challenge to all peaceloving nations." As in other bloc propaganda, it argued that the U.S. "claim" that "Cuba is 'threatening the security' of the United States" was a "clumsy maneuver."

The DRV and Mongolian governments on 26 October both issued statements supporting the Cuban "struggle," In contrast to the DPRK, both endorsed the Soviet Government statement.

A NHAN DAN editorial on 31 October, transmitted by the VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY, declared that the solidarity of the people of Cuba, the socialist camp, Latin America, Asia, and Africa had "forced the U.S. imperialists to make an initial concession" to give up the blockade and renounce invasion. A Hanoi domestic broadcast early on 30 October contained the first monitored reference from Hanoi to Khrushchev's 28 October message. Prior to this, Hanoi hai referred only to the initial Soviet Government statement of 23 October. The 30 October broadcast quoted Secretary of Defense McNamara to the effect that "the United States will continue to engage in military spying activities over Cuba,"

According to the Ulan Bator domestic service, Mongolian Council of Ministers Chairman Tsendenbal met with the Cuban ambassador to express Mongolian support and solidarity with the Cuban people. The Soviet Union and the socialist countries, he said, strongly denounced the U.S. Government's "aggressive" policy. The Ulan Bator news agency MONTSAME charged that President Kennedy used "bedraggled anticommunist methods," attempting to depict the threat as proceeding from the USSR and "maliciously asserting" that Cuba had been transformed into an "important strategic base" of the Soviet Union. Ulan Bator radio on 30 October reported that the 29 October UNEN, under the heading "A Realistic Proposal Which Meets the Interest of Peace," provided text of Khrushchev's 27 October message proposing liquidation of both Cuban and Turkish bases, accompanied by a roundup of Mongolian and "world protest" against U.S. "aggressive activities" with regard to Cuba.

PATHET LAO RADIO Radio Pathet Lao, announcing a "complete blockade" of Cuba, claimed that the President, "ignoring world criticism," took this action following

conferences with his advisors. The broadcast ignored the reasons for the action entirely. On 31 October the Pathet Lao radio briefly noted a TASS dispatch reporting that Khrushchev had sent a message to President Kennedy announcing the Soviet decision to dismantle the bases in Cuba.